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Subject. Comments of the Department of the Navy on the
Roport to the Entional Security Council entitled
"The Central Intelligence Agency and Entional
Organization for Intelligence" dated 1 January 1949.

- 1. The following comments and recommendations regarding the subject report are submitted by the Office of Eaval Intelligence. The report contained herein is confined to those "Conclusions and Recommendations" contained in the subject report which are of consern to the Department of the Mayy.
- 2. The majority of the "Conclusions and Recommendations" contained in the subject report may be catalogued under the following headings of which the first covers practically the entire report:
 - A. Coordination

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- B. The Intelligence Advisory Committee
- C. The Interdepartmental Coordinating and Planning Staff
- D. The Central Intelligence Agency
- E. Liscollaneous, which includes such matters as personnel, orisis estimates, and intolligence agencies other than the CIA.

The following comments and recommendations will be placed in the foregoing categories.

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RUCLOSURE (A)



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A. Coordination

The report states that the coordination function of the CIA is not being adequately expressed and that (page 5) "what is needed in continuing and effective ocordinating action under existing directives and also directives establishing more precisely the responsibility of the various intolligence agencies," The report also states that (page 5) "coordination can most effectively be achieved by mutual agreement among the various agencies." The National Security Act of 1947 charges the Director of the CIA with recommending to the National Security Council measures for coordination of the intelligence agencies but confers upon the Director no authority over those agencies. As each of those agencies is under its own Departmental Hoad, such authority would be inconsistent with normal command rolations. Consequently, the best or muisation for effectively establishing the desired degree of scordingtion appears to be the Intelligence Advisory Committee. The IAC will be dealt with in more detail in the next section of this report, but it is believed that the authority and responsibilities of the IAC could be broadened without conflict with the Matiemal Security Act of 1947 and thus enable this Committee to accomplish more effective coordination in the field of intelligence requirements. Among the essentials necessary to achieve




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proper coordination the subject report lists (page 54)
"continuous emmination on the initiative of the CIA of
instances of duplication and failure of coordination;
directives which establish more precisely the responsibilities of the various departments and the effective
carrying out of plans through close interdepartmental
consultation at all levels." Although the IAC has no
authority at present to issue coordinating directives,
it can be authorized to recommend such directives to
the IEC. The other essentials listed above appear to
be functions which the IAC could most effectively perform.

B. The Intelligence Advisory Committee

The subject report states that (page 63) "the Intelligence Advisory Committee is soundly conceived, but it should participate more actively with the Director of Central Intelligence in the continuing coordination of intelligence activities." It is also further stated in the discussion of Mational Intelligence Estimates that (page 81) "these estimates should be submitted for discussion and approval by the reconstituted Intelligence Advisory Countities whose numbers should assume collective responsibility for them." The Guief of Maval Intelligence questions the statement that "the IAC is soundly conceived The present MSCID No. 1 establishes the IAC "to advise the Director of Central Intelligence". This statement and the



name of the Committee are indicative that its functions are purely advisory and that it is without sutherity.

In the matter of making recommendations to and advising the DSC these recommendations and this advice originate with the Director of the CTA who indicated the concurrence or nonconcurrence of the IAC members. There is no requirement that recommendations or advice which originate with members of the IAC be forwarded to the Council unless the Director of CTA sees fit to do so. It is believed that recommendations or advice which originates with a number of the IAC should be forwarded to the Council whether the Director of CTA agrees or not.

Directives issued in implementation of Inticnal Security Council Directives are now issued by the Director of the CIA after unanimous concurrence by the IAC. This procedure could be strengthened as will be indicated later in this paragraph.

The second quotation above states that the IAC mambers "should assume collective responsibility" for National Intelligence Estimates. It is submitted that if the IAC members are to assume "collective responsibility" they should be assigned collective authority.



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rather than a collective advisory espacity, in the production of these estimates.


In order to effect the improvements indicated in the subject report and to overcome the defects in the charter of the IAC, it is recommended that the present ESCID No. 1 be reissued along the lines indicated in the proposed redraft attached and labelled Enclosure

(B). This proposal would change the name of the Committee to "Intelligence Coordinating Committee".

Home of the changes indicated usurp any of the authority delegated to the Director of the CIA by the National Security Act of 1947. All changes are intended to strengthen the coordinating machinery of the governmental intelligence agencies.

C. The Interdepartmental Coordinating and Planning Staff

The subject report nales a number of comments regarding ICAPS, many of which are organizational in character within GIA. The report states that it should be reconstituted and suggests the name of "Coordination Division". The report further states that its assigned mission, which it has failed to execute, (page 46) is "to review the intelligence activities of the government, and assist the Director in initiating measures of coordination for recommendation to the Estimal



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Security Council. The report roccanends that (page 65) "ICAPS should be reconstituted as a staff responsible only to the Director of CIA." This is not understood since ICAPS is now considered responsible only to the Director of CIA. The original concept of ICAPS was that it should not as a staff for the IAC but this has not been carried out in practice. The original concept is considered preferrable to the present arrangement.

The following renommendations regarding ICAPS are submitted:

- 1. Redesignate ICAPS as the "Coordinating Staff" under the IAC (ICC).
- 2. Propare a procedure for this staff containing the following provisions:
 - (a) The ICAPS (CS) shall be composed of members appointed by the member agencies of the IAC (ICC). A representative appointed by the Director of the CIA shall be the Chairman.
 - (b) ICAPS (CS) shall: (1) keep under continuous review the status of coordination among the various intelligence agencies and males react mondations to the IAC (ICC) for improvement therein; (2) maintain close limited with number agencies of the IAC (ICC) and other



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the Intional Security with a view to establishing most effective collection of
essential information, determining their
intolligence needs and insuring an effective
interdepertmental dissemination of intelligence; (3) perform such staff functions as
the IAG (IGC) may assign, including initial
drafts of proposals for the consideration of
the IAG (IGC) and periodic checks to insure
proper implementation of intelligence directives under the cognisance of the IAG (IGC):
(4) determination of "Germon Services" whichcan be best performed by the CIA.

In other words, the ICAPS (CS) relationship to the IAC (ICC) should approximate that of the Joint Intelligence Group to the Joint Intelligence Committee, with respect to matters of policy and procedures. Approval of the above recommendations should be followed by a written charter for ICAPS (CS).

D. The Central Intelligence Agency

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rocognise that he (the Director) may be either civilian or military, we have reached the conclusion that he should be a civilian" unless (page 137) The should resign from active military duty and thereafter work as a civilian". The report implies that a Director drawn from the military would be either (a) less competent or (b) less permanent than a civilian. As to (a), the most competent individual, civilian or military, who is willing to make the assignment a career should be appointed. There are many experienced and competent officers in the Hilltary Establishment and no legal bar to their appointment is recommended. The loyalty, patriotism, and maturity of judgment of military officers in the upper ranks has been thoroughly tested. With one possible exception, all successful foreign secret services are presently headed by military officers and have been for many years. As to (b), it is probable that even greater difficulty would be encountered in obtaining permanency of temure with a civilian than with a military officer. Very few roally outstanding civilians in this field have been persuaded to remain in government service indefinitely. It is believed

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EDICTOSIDES (V.)

man assigned as the Director of Central Intelligence should "retire" rather than "resign" as
resignation would result in the loss of retirement benefits. An officer's equity in future
retired pay should be protected by suitable
wording in any logislation saking retirement
mandatory. It is suggested that an officer
from the services assigned this duty in the
future undergo a trial period of approximately
six ments. His assignment should then be made
permanent to, say, age 60, provided (1) the
flational Security Council is convinced of his
competence, (2) the officer desires the assignment, and (3) he agrees to retire.





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HATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE NO. 1 COOPDINATION AND ADVISORY RESPONSIBILITIES AND FUNCTIONS

Pursuant to the provisions of Section 102 of the Mational Security
Act of 1927, and for the purposes anumciated in paragraphs (d) and (e)
thereof, the National Security Council hereby authorizes and directs that:

To maintain the relationship essential to coordination between the Central Intelligence Arency and the intelligence organizations, an Intelligence Coordinating Committee consisting of the respective intelligence chiefs from the Departments of State, Army, Navy, and Air Force and from the Joint Staff (JCS), and the Atomic Energy Commission, or their representatives, shall be established to make recommendations to the Hational Security Council for the coordination of such intelligence activities of the departments and agencies of the government as relate to the National Security. The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency shall be the Chairman thereof and he shall invite the chief, or his representative, of any other intellimence agency having functions related to the national security to sit with the Intelligence Coordinating Committee whenever matters within the purview of his agency are to be discussed. The Intelligence Coordinating Committee shall establish its own procedures, including procedures for the coordination and preparation of national intelligence estimates in both routine and in orisis situations.

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
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- 2. Coordination of intelligence activities should be designed primarily to strengthen the overall governmental intelligence structure. Frimary departmental requirements shall be recognized and shall receive the cooperation and support of all other intelligence agencies.
 - Recommendations of the Director of Central Intelligence and of the Intelligence Coordinating Committee
 shall be forwarded to the National Security Council by the
 chairman of that Committee. These recommendations shall
 indicate the concurrence or nonconcurrence of the members
 of the ICC and shall contain the views of the dissenting
 members set forth in full. When unanimity is not obtained
 among the Department Heads of the National Military Establishment, the Chairman shall refer the problem to the Secretary
 of Defense before presenting it to the National Security
 Council. The foregoing procedure shall also be followed by
 the Director of Central Intelligence in forwarding recommendations or in siving advice to the National Security Council.
 - b. Recommendations of the Firector of Central Intelligence, or of the Intelligence Coordinating Committee, shall, when approved by the National Security Council, issue as Council Directives to the originator. The respective intelligence chiefs shall be responsible for insuring that such orders and directives, when applicable, are implemented within their intelligence organizations.

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- c. The Intelligence Coordinating Committee shall act for the National Security Council to insure full and proper implementation of Council Intelligence Directives by issuing such supplementary ICC directives as may be required. Such implementing directives in which the Intelligence Coordinating Committee concurs unanimously shall be issued by the Chairman thereof, and shall be implemented within the departments as provided in paragraph b. Where disagreement arises between members of the Intelligence Coordinating Committee over such directives, the proposed directive shall be forwarded to the National Security Council for decision as provided in paragraph g.
- 3. The Director of Central Intelligence shall produce intelligence relating to the national socurity, hereafter referred to as national intelligence. In so far as practicable, he shall not duplicate the intelligence activities and research of the various departments and agencies but shall make use of existing intelligence facilities and shall utilize departmental intelligence for such production purposes. For definitions see MSCID No. 3.
- 4. The Director of Central Intelligence shall disseminate National Intelligence to the President, to members of the National Security Council, to the Intelligence Chiefs of the IAC agencies, and to such governmental departments and agencies as the National Security Council from time to time may designate. Intelligence so disseminated shall be officially concurred in by the intelligence



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agencies or shall carry an agreed statement of substantial dissent.

- 5. When Security Regulations of the originating agency permit, the Birector of Central Intelligence shall disseminate to the Federal Sureau of Investigation and other departments or arencies intelligence or intelligence information which he may possess when he doesns such dissemination appropriate to their functions relating to the national security.
- 6. The Director of Central Intelligence shall perform for the benefit of the existing intelligence agencies such services of example concern to these agencies as the National Socurity Council determines can be more efficiently accomplished centrally.
- 7. The intelligence organizations in each of the departments and agencies shall maintain with the Central Intelligence Avency and with each other, as appropriate to their respective responsibilities, a continuing interchange of intelligence information and intelligence available to them.
- 3. The intelligence files in each intelligence organization, including the SIA, shall be eade available under security regulations of the department or agency concerned to the others for consultation.
- O. The intolliance organizations within the limits of their carabilities shall provide, or procure, such intelligence as may

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be requested by the Director of Control Intelligence or by one of the other departments or agencies.

ments with the respective departments and agencies to assign to the Central Intelligence agency such experienced and qualified officers and members as may be of adventage for advisory, operational, or other purposes, in addition to such personnel as the Director of Central Intelligence may directly employ. In each case, such departmental personnel will be subject to the necessary personnel procedures of each department.

11. The provisions of this directive shall not be construed?
as an abrogation of any right or responsibility conformed upon
any individual or organization by duly constituted authority.

NOTE: If this directive is approved DCI Directive 1/1 will

require revision to conform.



Enclosure (B)

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